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The agricultural transformation of less developed countries, commonly referred to as 
the Green Revolution, is the result of one of the most ambitious international development 
programs of US-American philanthropy. In particular, the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) was 
one of the first philanthropic organizations to devote substantial attention to solving problems 
of world hunger after World War II. The RF led the first efforts in the 1940s to increase the 
productivity of wheat and corn in Mexico and therefore became a central agency in altering 
agricultural practices on a worldwide scale. What has been called the Green Revolution was a 
vast and technically complex pattern of agricultural modernization, “aimed at increasing the 
productivity of land by means of the introduction of a science-based technology.”1 The 
technological package consisted of seeds of new high-yielding varieties in conjunction with 
the capital-intensive utilization of chemical fertilizers and insecticides, disease-control 
measures, agricultural machinery and soil and water management. 
The Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP) that the RF initiated in 1943 was not only 
a pioneering effort in the development of scientific agriculture, but also in the creation of a 
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paradigm for technical assistance in the following decades. The RF formula of promoting 
agricultural research and developing new high-yielding technologies gradually crystallized 
into a clear-cut and simple development strategy: the transfer of Western agricultural 
technology to less developed regions. Significant increases in the production of basic food 
crops laid the ground work for similar programs during the 1950s and 1960s in Latin 
America, Asia and Africa, and MAP served as a prototype of technical assistance programs in 
the literature on agricultural modernization.
2
 But by the time RF agronomist Norman Borlaug 
received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970 and was praised by the Award Committee as the man 
who “made it possible for the developing countries to break away from hunger and poverty,”3 
the Green Revolution already had produced an extensive controversy about the applicability 
of Western agricultural models. While the Green Revolution remained for many observers 
the triumph of high science over hunger, the critics began to attack its economic, social and 
environmental effects.
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In order to conceptualize the Green Revolution as a preliminary model for rural 
modernization, my research project focuses on the origins, premises and aims of the 
development of scientific agriculture in Mexico, the birthplace of the “Green Revolution.” 
During May, 2009 I had the opportunity to visit the Rockefeller Archive Center for the 
second time. With the generous support of a Grant-in-Aid I was able to intensify my research 
in the extensive documentary holdings. The existing records provide a broad and detailed 
picture of the Rockefeller Foundation‟s involvement in agricultural modernization projects, 
from the initiation of the Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP) in 1943 to the establishment 
of the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center and the following 
internationalization of RF-sponsored research in the 1950s and 1960s.
5
  
I spent ample time investigating the documents in Record Group 3, Administration, 
Program and Policy (RG 3.2. Series 923 and Series 915), which include some of the RF‟s 
major policy papers concerning agricultural development. The files in Record Group 1.1. and 
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Record Group 1.2, Projects (Series 323, Mexico) allowed me some insights into the general 
ideas held by the RF concerning scientific agriculture as well as how these ideas were 
integrated with Mexican government institutions. In order to identify the key features of the 
Mexican Agricultural Program, I extensively reviewed the files of the RF‟s field office in 
Mexico in Record Group 6.13. These papers include internal correspondence, memoranda, 
project files and annual reports related to MAP. They detail the process by which the RF 
moved into Mexico and illuminate the Rockefeller Foundation‟s perception of the political, 
social and economic situation in the country. The Oral History interviews (RG 13) with 
numerous scientists who were key figures in the development and the diffusion of the Green 
Revolution proved to be invaluable to my research. They are full of unique information and 
often contain very personal and honest opinions about the discussions and deliberations 
within the Rockefeller Foundation about the development of its agricultural program. 
In order to understand how MAP become such an appealing example for technical 
assistance for policy-makers and development institutions in the 1950s and 1960s, but also 
raised widespread criticism in the 1970s, I would like to specify several features which 
distinguished MAP from earlier efforts of technical assistance. 
First, MAP was an operational program, based on an agreement between a private 
foundation and the Mexican government. The RF practice before the start of MAP had been 
to make direct grants of money to universities and other existing research institutions and 
leave it to them to formulate, organize, and conduct the specific research.
6
 With the Mexican 
Agricultural Program the RF was established an approach that went beyond its traditional 
role as a provider of funds. It was the first time in the history of agricultural assistance that a 
private foundation aimed at establishing a scientific infrastructure in a foreign country.
7
 RF 
officers exerted effective control over the project, defined the research agenda and took direct 
responsibility for running the program. They were responsible for the hiring of the top-level 
scientific personnel and thereby ensured the development of a “proper” scientific manner as a 
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blueprint of U.S. scientific and agricultural practices. Thus, the Rockefeller Foundation 
created an effective and institutionalised research apparatus in order to organize and 
transform Mexican agriculture.  
 Second, the clear-cut purpose of MAP was to improve Mexican food-crop 
production. The problem definition of the Rockefeller Foundation was quite simple: Mexican 
lands were not sufficiently productive. And indeed, the success of MAP in terms of 
production between 1945 and 1965 was very significant. The overall productivity of Mexican 
agriculture increased more rapidly than the population and in 1956 self-sufficiency in wheat 
and corn was achieved. In 1958, Mexico became for the first time in its history a wheat-
exporting country. But by defining the research agenda only in terms of production, the RF 
avoided fundamental political questions about the allocation and control of resources and 
remained largely oblivious to the problem of food distribution and the question of who would 
benefit from an increase in productivity.  The keyword for the foundation was scientific 
research, not economic justice. Most notably Cynthia Hewitt has argued that the focus of 
MAP on developing the very highest yielding materials benefitted large landholders with 
easy access to capital and material, whereas the large majority of small-scale peasants were 
unable to effectively use the new technologies. “In theory, the new „technological package‟ 
was scale neutral, applicable to farms of any size. But given the reality of the Mexican 
countryside,” she argues, this technological package “was most profitably utilized only by the 
best-endowed, and most politically powerful, farming groups in the nation.”8 
 Third, the Rockefeller Foundation trustees were well aware that MAP was 
consistent with broader strategical and geopolitical concerns of the U.S. government. The RF 
wanted to ensure the counter-revolutionary modernization of Mexican agriculture, and the 
goals of MAP coincided with efforts of the Mexican government under president Camacho 
(1940-1946) to temper the socialist radicalism of the Cárdenas government (1934-1940).  
Lázaro Cárdenas had initiated a far-reaching program of land reform in favour of peasant 
5 
 
communities, but the new president, Manuel Ávila Camacho, wanted to recommit the country 
to development based on “private enterprise” and modernization after the capitalist model, 
which did not fit well with the peasant-based agrarian structure created by the former 
government.
9
 Altogether, MAP was an alliance between a U.S. based foundation that 
supported liberal democratic capitalism and a Mexican government that sought to create a 
new economy based on industrialization and commercial agriculture. In this case, the 
modernization agenda of the recipient merged perfectly with the goals of the Rockefeller 
Foundation. 
  Finally, records at the Rockefeller Archive Center reveal that RF officers were well 
aware of the broader objectives of American foreign policy. A strategic paper issued by the 
RF asserted that “whether additional millions [...] will become Communists will depend 
partly on whether the Communist world or the free world fulfils its promises. Hungry people 
are lured by promises, but they may be won by deeds. Communism makes attractive promises 
to underfed peoples. Democracy must not only promise as much, but must deliver more.”10 
But even if the RF had strong economic and geopolitical incentives to support the 
Camacho government, I did not find much historical evidence at the RAC that the 
Rockefeller Foundation was mainly preoccupied with the vulnerability of the Rockefeller 
family‟s massive investments in Mexico.11  MAP was in fact primarily motivated by 
humanitarian concerns and an impulse to help the Mexican farmers. It profoundly reflected 
the deep belief of the RF‟s trustees and managers in the universally beneficial applicability of 
science and in its potential to transform societies from traditional to modern.
12
 The implicit 
assumption underlying all agricultural activities was that a “traditional” agricultural sector 
and poor nutrition were the main factors in retarding Mexican development. The solution to 
Mexico‟s agricultural problem was just a question of a proper management of research and 
education and the transfer of U.S. agricultural technology to the Mexican soil.
13
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 The Rockefeller Foundation acted as a missionary agent, convinced that it would 
“modernize” a “traditional” country for the better. Thus, the RF effectively foreshadowed 
what was to become in the 1950s and 1960s the discourse of modernization theory and the 
practice of “Third World Developmentalism” – and established simultaneously a new pattern 
of technical assistance and technology transfer that would function as a model for subsequent 
American foreign aid programs in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, MAP and subsequent 
programs in other Latin American countries had produced remarkable results – and were 
therefore appealing examples for modernization theorists that the Western world could 
transfer “its technical skills to a friendly neighbor at relatively little cost.”14 But the 
spectacular growth of agricultural production in Mexico was largely based upon the output of 
a small percentage of farm land, operated by large commercial producers that could afford 
the capital-intensive technologies, whereas the majority of the rural population was still 
producing at a subsistence level. As the work of several anthropologists, sociologists and 
historians has shown, the MAP did very little for the rural poor and deeply affected social 
relations on the countryside.   
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